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References 24This paper is no more than a critical comment on Mancur Olson's interpretation of
the exceptional growth performance of the West German economy in the 1950s.
The main point of our critique is that Olson's theory - though elegant and
intriguing in its own right - places the emphasis on factors which are relevant in a
fundamental theoretical sense, but which can hardly figure as the core of an
explanatory account of the observed growth pattern in the post-war period and in
later times. In fact, a different, more narrowly economic framework of
interpretation is proposed in which the Olsonian factors are put in proper
perspective.
The paper is divided into three parts. In part 1, we summarize the main tenets of
the Olsonian theory and their empirical implications. In part 2, we confront this
theory with the facts of post-war Germany. In part 3, we propose our own
interpretation of these facts and draw some wider conclusions.
1. The Olson Hypothesis
In his seminal book The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982)
1, Mancur Olson
develops a specific theory of economic growth, which is in essence an application
and extention of the theory of interest groups, collusions, and distributional
coalitions of his book The Logic of Collective Action (1965).
2 With some
courageous simplifications that are justified only with regard to the particular
topic and purpose of this paper, the core of this LOCA/RADON-theory of growth
may be summarized in four propositions, of which the first goes back to LOCA,
the remaining three to RADON.
1. Selective incentives: Due to standard free-riding problems, the existence of a
large group with a common interest does only give rise to collective action in
the pursuit of its interest if the group can provide sufficient selective incentives
for the individuals to contribute to the provision of the respective public good.
1 In the following paragraphs abbreviated as RADON.
2 In the following paragraphs abbreviated as LOCA.2. Time and stability: As the provision of selective incentives (with appropriate
arrangements of coercion) takes time and requires a more or less constant
institutional setting, stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to
accumulate ever more distributional coalitions (collusions and organizations
for collective action) over time.
3. Efficiency: On balance, distributional coalitions reduce efficiency - both in
static and dynamic terms - through a variety of channels; in particular, they are
relatively slow decision makers, which tend to fix prices rather than quantities,
they seek to pursue egalitarian aims, they slow down societies' capacity to
adjust to new technologies and to reallocate resources accordingly, and they
favour extensive regulation and government intervention.
4. Encompassment: To the extent that the relevant distributional coalitions are
encompassing, their group interests tend to coincide with society's interests so
that, economically speaking, the negative externalities are internalized and the
efficiency loss is avoided.
These four hypotheses together form the core of a genuine theory of economic
efficiency and growth of geographical and political entities, or, more poetically, of
the rise and decline of nations. According to this theory, economies prosper
whenever they are relieved from the burden of collective action of interest groups
by whatever exogenous shocks (e.g. a revolution, a war) that destroy the
traditional network of collusive arrangements and distributional coalitions.
Conversely, they suffer in the course of the gradual (re)building of this network in
extended phases of political and social stability. They are spared this process of
sklerosis if, from the start, the relevant distributional coalitions are encompassing.
So much for the main elements of Olson's theory and their general implications
for the link between what might be called the degree of distributional or
institutional sklerosis of a country and its growth performance. It is important to
realize that Olson regards this degree of sklerosis not just as another explanatory
variable to be put side by side to a long list of others, but rather, econometrically
speaking, as the deep cause that drives economic growth, with all other factors
either being virtually irrelevant (such as, e.g., the availability of raw materials and
natural resources) or in the last resort being an (endogenous) consequence of the
particular institutional setting (like, e.g., the level and speed of physical and
human capital accumulation).
3
3 See, most clearly, his critique of the new growth theories in Olson (1993). ,As it stands, Olson's theory is an impressively parsimonious construction which, if
successful, would really conform to Milton Friedman's celebrated methodological
postulate that social scientists should aim at explaining much by little.
4 Its internal
logic is impeccable - not least because it is based on the solid ground of well-
established public goods theory. Thus the propositions 1, 3 and 4 appear to be
fairly easy to swallow for an economist accustomed to applying the strict criteria
of constrained optimization not only to firms and households, but also to whatever
coalitions or collusions.
With proposition 2, things are somewhat different and more problematic, because
it involves a very powerful premise that does not follow from standard economic
reasoning, namely that the provision of selective incentives takes time. Prima
facie, this may appear to be a completely innocent truism because any institutional
arrangement involving a large number of participants seems to require extended
organizational efforts to mature. On closer inspection, however, it becomes hard
to recognize where precisely the economic reasons for collective action lagging
behind the respective collective interest should be located, and what the
quantitative dimension of the lag should be (a year? a decade? a century?). As so
often when lags enter the picture in economics, the matter turns out very fuzzy,
and Olson does not provide any systematic guidance on the issue
In his RADON, Olson presents some empirical observations to support his view,
but these are not really convincing - less because they are casual, which can
hardly be avoided given the broad nature of the issue, but rather because they do
not separate and isolate the (Olsonian) gradual extension of collective action from
the (non-Olsonian) growth of the collective interest itself. E.g., Olson's most
prominent example for the time-consuming nature of forming distributional
coalitions is the gradual rise of unionization in the 19th and 20th century in the
major European countries and the United States.
5 However, this very rise allows
two conflicting interpretations: an Olsonian one - implicitly assuming that the
collective interest was there in the first place, but took much time to be translated
into collective action due to the difficulties of providing a rational set of selective
incentives - and a more standard non-Olsonian one - assuming that it was the
collective interest itself that took much time to grow more or less pari passu with
the process of industrialization and, as a mere consequence, collective action rose
4 See Friedman (1953).
5 Olson (1982), pp. 38-40:slowly as well. To us, the second interpretation looks somewhat more plausible
because, historically, unionization appears to be closely linked to the growing
quantitative importance of an 'urban class' of skilled workers who were not easily
substitutable either by unskilled labour from the rural hinterland or by machinery
equipment (to which they were complementary precisely because of their skills).
In fact, at least in Germany, unions were founded first in those branches of
economic activity where this skill-based monopoly power was relatively high like,
e.g., book-printing. In this interpretation, the slow rise of unionism becomes a
mere reflection of the rise of skill-based monopoly power and the concomitant rise
of the returns to collective action, not of a gradual victory over the difficulties of
organizing a collective action that was profitable from the start.
It is important to recognize that these two divergent interpretations have also
vastly different empirical implications for the crucial experiment of a wholesale
destruction of distributional coalitions (due to, say, war, occupation, revolution
etc.). If it is the returns to collective action themselves that matter, then the
institutional void will end as soon as the interests that prevailed before are
reestablished, with the appropriate selective incentives to back up collective action
following suit without significant delay. There will be no slow and protracted
attempts to rebuild the network, but rather a once-for-all shift back to the old
institutions (or the 'modern
1 substitutes for them), if the interests remain
unchanged, or no such institutions at all, if the interests have been removed. Only
if they gradually reemerge will there be a process of sklerosis, and the relevant
story to be told will then be one of a genuine shifting balance of interests in
society, not one of 'distributional lacunae' and, for that matter, 'institutional
hysteresis'. It is then not quite an Olsonian story. If, in turn, it is not the returns to
collective action, but the (free-rider) problems of setting up a viable system of
distributional coalitions which prevents the reemergence of powerful interests in
politics and in the economy, then - and only then - the story is to be told in
Olsonian terms.
In our view, it is a serious shortcoming of a LOCA/RADON-theory of growth that
the important proposition 2 is neither theoretically substantiated, nor supported by
any powerful piece of evidence. In fact, Olson does at no point make a clear-cut
distinction between the two kinds of sklerosis we described above. This is
important to keep in mind when dealing with the empirics of the matter in the
following paragraphs of this paper.2. Olson's Theory and the West German Facts
An Olsonian account of West German economic history after World War II could
be summarized in basically three propositions: (a) Through Nazi-dictatorship and
war-time physical and social destruction and the subsequent Allied occupation of
the country, the traditional network of distributional coalitions in Germany was
fatally weakened in the decade or so after the war so that the economy could for a
while grow unburdened by the static and dynamic efficiency losses induced by
institutional sklerosis. (b) To the extent that the distributional coalitions
reappeared early on, they did so in a much more encompassing form that helped to
prevent a persistent divergence between the respective coalitions' and society's
interests to emerge, (c) Over time, the economy was gradually subjected again to
the growth-impeding network of distributional coalitions which typically gain
ground in stable societies; thus, after all, the German miracle began to fade from
the 1960s on. In the following paragraphs, we shall not provide a rich and robust
test of these propositions. We shall rather confine ourselves to some major facts
and interpretations that shed light on the core of the matter.
(a) A liberation from interest groups?
Any serious discussion of the role of World War II as a historical watershed of
whatever kind must first recognize the fact that, in its most fundamental legal,
political and economic characteristics, the Bonn republic as it emerged through
the reestablishment of a market economy in 1948 and a parliamentary democracy
in 1949 was -first and foremost- a descendent of the Weimar republic of
1919-33. This is not to say that there may not have been substantial differences
between the two, which may also matter in the sense of Olson's theory; it is to say,
however, that the basic point of reference and even the starting-point for deliberate
deviations were the Weimar institutions. In this sense, both the Nazi period and
the Allied occupation with their systems of administrative control of political and
economic life were pauses - though very different ones - in an otherwise
continuous tradition. Both left traces that changed the track of German society for
good; but for neither can it be claimed that they influenced the institutional
framework of later West Germany more than the 'hysteretic' shadow of the
Weimar republic did. After all, the great institutional transformations in Germany
had happened at earlier times: politically from autocracy to democracy towards
the end of World War I, legally to a modern 'Rechtsstaat' with an elaborate
national system of codified private and public law in imperial times, economicallytowards a 'corporatist' industrial society with a prominent role of collective
bargaining in the early 1920s. Thus there was never really an institutional void
that had to be filled with newly invented laws, a situation many post-socialist
countries of eastern Europe face today - notably the successor states of the
Soviet Union that were not yet parliamentary democracies and market economies
in the interwar period. For the Allies and the Germans after the war, it was more
the question whether, when and to what extent the pre-Nazi regime would be re-
implemented, and which particular changes would have to be made to avoid some
most unfortunate developments of the Weimar period.
In this respect, it is of course the period of Allied occupation from May 1945 until
the economic liberalization in June 1948 and the election to the first federal
parliament in September 1949 that deserves careful examination. Taking a bird's
eye view of this period, it is remarkable how much scope and leeway for
collective action the Allies (always excluding the Russians in the eastern zone that
was later to become the German Democratic Republic) left to newly founded or
re-founded German interest groups, and how strongly these organizations
represented their traditional pre-Nazi interests. Politically, this can be explained
by the specific aims of the Allied forces: after a first virtually complete standstill
of German political and economic activities in mid-1945 right after the end of
World War II, the country was simply to be put to work again, and this was to be
done without reactivating a Nazi influence; for this purpose, the extensive use of
personnel and expertise of pre-Nazi vintage and origin was obviously
indispensable, and the price to be paid in terms of a resurgence of lobbies,
coalitions and collusions was viewed to be bearable as long as no overly
centralized German organization could challenge the Allies' internal enforcement
power.
In the light of Olson's theory, three types of organizations stand out in importance
as distributional coalitions: political parties, unions and business associations. All
three reemerged early on with ideas, ideologies, practical purposes, and a
personnel that were in full continuity to Weimar times.
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Let us first look at political parties. The major left-wing parties - the Social
Democrats and the Communists -were able to reestablish the core of their party
organizations by early 1946, and they did so in more or less the same highly
For an authoritative account of the resurgence of these organizations after World War II, see
Eschenburg (1983), pp. 171-218.centralized institutional form as before: only in the first few weeks and months
after the war did Allied restrictions force them to confine their refounding
activities to the local level. The main reason for the fast reactivation of these
parties was their thorough opposition to the Nazi-regime and, ironically, the rather
strong persecution they suffered in the twelve years of Nazi-dictatorship:
condemned to the existence of underground movements, both parties and their
membership developed a sophisticated infrastructure of clandestine activity, which
could rather easily be turned into an official political organization as soon as the
Nazi regime was over. Economically speaking, these parties had not to incur any
substantial start-up costs of collective organization, and as their membership had
developed and conserved a strong feeling of ideological identity as well as mutual
trust and understanding - typical for left-wing movements that in imperial times
grew out of a persistent opposition to the ruling class - there were simply no
obstacles to a genuine organizational restoration. As to the personnel, there were
losses due to the Nazi persecution and the war, but, nevertheless, virtually all
major personalities of post-war social democracy and communism in
West Germany were well-known politicians from the Weimar republic (including
the charismatic and influential first post-war leader of the Social Democrats Kurt
Schumacher).
On the conservative and liberal side of the political spectrum, the process of
organization took somewhat longer, but probably not more than roughly
two years: when, by early summer 1947, all newly established states (Lander) had
held their first post-war election of state parliaments, the new party structure had
already taken shape, with the dominant political forces being the
Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and, to a lesser extent, the Free
Democrats, which were all to remain the major political parties for the next four
decades. Unlike in the case of the Social Democrats (and, for that matter, the
Communists), however, the new organization of conservative and liberal forces
involved a process of consolidation: contrary to the Weimar republic, both
political liberalism and conservatism were to be united under two 'umbrella
parties' that were to bind together different ideological wings, which had been
represented by different parties in earlier times.
In the case of the liberals, the consolidation involved the merging of a more
right-wing nationalist version of liberalism that had its strongholds in northern and
north-western Germany, with a more left-wing southern version. In the case of the
conservatives, it involved above all the merging of the core of the catholic party'Zentrum', which had grown out of the resistance against protestant cultural
dominance in imperial times and which had its strongholds in the catholic parts of
western and southern Germany (notably in the Christian labour movement of the
southern industrial heartlands) with the more protestant conservatism of northern
Germany. While some splinter parties of the old Weimar tradition survived for a
while (including a shadow version of the old 'Zentrum'), the newly founded
umbrella organizations were basically successful in uniting the two respective
political movements and thus laid the ground for their cooperation and in fact
coalition in successive federal governments. In this respect, there was a shift
towards more encompassing political organizations in the Olsonian sense.
Note, however, that this shift towards encompassment did not arise out of
anything like a genuine institutional void, and was not a consequence of Allied
pressure. (If anything, the Allies still favoured relatively weak parties that did not
endanger their monopoly of power!) Instead, it had much more the character of a
deliberate lesson learned from the poor record of parliamentary instability of the
Weimar period: precisely because the main personalities behind the refounding of
the parties had been active politicians in the Weimar period - some of them like
the later chancellor Adenauer even in imperial times -, they did vividly remember
the deficiencies of the Weimar system with its dominance of political splinter
groups, its lack of party discipline, its fragmented parliament and its weak
executive. This did not only lead to the introduction of strong safeguards for stable
government in the later constitution (such as, from the second federal election on,
the use of a 'five-percentage clause' to limit the number of parties in parliament in
a system of proportional representation); it also gave party founders a strong sense
of urgency to overcome sectarian interests and ideologies and to bundle political
forces. In this sense, it was precisely not the historical discontinuity of a lost war
and Allied occupation that favoured a salutory change, but the continuity of
historical experience and the memory of a brave 'ancien regime' whose
construction principals and democratic culture had turned out to be severely
deficient in practice.
So much for the political parties. As to business and employers' associations, the
process of refounding took much longer- mainly because the Allies were
particularly cautious in allowing official links between private firms in view of
their political aim to restrict German economic power and at any rate not to
support tendencies towards a re-cartelization. In fact, most industry-wide
associations and their two major national umbrella oranizations - the 'Federationcentralized institutional form as before: only in the first few weeks and months
after the war did Allied restrictions force them to confine their refounding
activities to the local level. The main reason for the fast reactivation of these
parties was their thorough opposition to the Nazi-regime and, ironically, the rather
strong persecution they suffered in the twelve years of Nazi-dictatorship:
condemned to the existence of underground movements, both parties and their
membership developed a sophisticated infrastructure of clandestine activity, which
could rather easily be turned into an official political organization as soon as the
Nazi regime was over. Economically speaking, these parties had not to incur any
substantial start-up costs of collective organization, and as their membership had
developed and conserved a strong feeling of ideological identity as well as mutual
trust and understanding - typical for left-wing movements that in imperial times
grew out of a persistent opposition to the ruling class - there were simply no
obstacles to a genuine organizational restoration. As to the personnel, there were
losses due to the Nazi persecution and the war, but, nevertheless, virtually all:
major personalities of post-war social democracy and communism in
West Germany were well-known politicians from the Weimar republic (including
the charismatic and influential first post-war leader of the Social Democrats Kurt
Schumacher).
On the conservative and liberal side of the political spectrum, the process of
organization took somewhat longer, but probably not more than roughly
two years: when, by early summer 1947, all newly established states (Lander) had
held their first post-war election of state parliaments, the new party structure had
already taken shape, with the dominant political forces being the
Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and, to a lesser extent, the Free
Democrats, which were all to remain the major political parties for the next four
decades. Unlike in the case of the Social Democrats (and, for that matter, the
Communists), however, the new organization of conservative and liberal forces
involved a process of consolidation: contrary to the Weimar republic, both
political liberalism and conservatism were to be united under two 'umbrella
parties' that were to bind together different ideological wings, which had been
represented by different parties in earlier times.
In the case of the liberals, the consolidation involved the merging of a more
right-wing nationalist version of liberalism that had its strongholds in northern and
north-western Germany, with a more left-wing southern version. In the case of the
conservatives, it involved above all the merging of the core of the catholic party'Zentrum', which had grown out of the resistance against protestant cultural
dominance in imperial times and which had its strongholds in the catholic parts of
western and southern Germany (notably in the Christian labour movement of the
southern industrial heartlands) with the more protestant conservatism of northern
Germany. While some splinter parties of the old Weimar tradition survived for a
while (including a shadow version of the old 'Zentrum'), the newly founded
umbrella organizations were basically successful in uniting the two respective
political movements and thus laid the ground for their cooperation and in fact
coalition in successive federal governments. In this respect, there was a shift
towards more encompassing political organizations in the Olsonian sense.
Note, however, that this shift towards encompassment did not arise out of
anything like a genuine institutional void, and was not a consequence of Allied
pressure. (If anything, the Allies still favoured relatively weak parties that did not
endanger their monopoly of power!) Instead, it had much more the character of a
deliberate lesson learned from the poor record of parliamentary instability of the
Weimar period: precisely because the main personalities behind the refounding of
the parties had been active politicians in the Weimar period - some of them like
the later chancellor Adenauer even in imperial times -, they did vividly remember
the deficiencies of the Weimar system with its dominance of political splinter
groups, its lack of party discipline, its fragmented parliament and its weak
executive. This did not only lead to the introduction of strong safeguards for stable
government in the later constitution (such as, from the second federal election on,
the use of a 'five-percentage clause' to limit the number of parties in parliament in
a system of proportional representation); it also gave party founders a strong sense
of urgency to overcome sectarian interests and ideologies and to bundle political
forces. In this sense, it was precisely not the historical discontinuity of a lost war
and Allied occupation that favoured a salutory change, but the continuity of
historical experience and the memory of a brave 'ancien regime' whose
construction principals and democratic culture had turned out to be severely
deficient in practice.
So much for the political parties. As to business and employers' associations, the
process of refounding took much longer - mainly because the Allies were
particularly cautious in allowing official links between private firms in view of
their political aim to restrict German economic power and at any rate not to
support tendencies towards a re-cartelization. In fact, most industry-wide
associations and their two major national umbrella oranizations - the 'Federationof German Industry' (BDI) and the 'Federation of German Employers' (BDA) were
founded right after the new West German state had taken shape in autumn 1949 -
and with it the so-called principle of autonomous wage bargaining which assigned
again a prominent role to collective negotiations.
7
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to regard the occupied post-war German
economy in the years 1945-48/49 as a place where the traditional links of
communication and coordination between private firms had been cut off. Rather
the empirical picture is one of an implicit transfer of these functions from the
former associations to the chambers of industry and commerce, i.e. to those
'classical' corporatist institutions which had been founded in the mid-19th century
and which were essentially service agencies to provide business with advice,
information, contacts to local and regional authorities and, if necessary, with a
lobby voice in politics. These typically German organizations, \yhich had (and still
have) a semi-public status and therefore can recruit members on a compulsory
basis within their officially defined realm of activity, have always been well-
known for the relatively high quality of their staff and a wide-ranging influence in
administrative matters. This is why, from the very beginning, the Allies were
unable to bypass these organizations, which had survived Nazi-dictatorship more
or less intact and thus had conserved their stock of knowledge concerning the
working of the German economy down to the nitty-gritty legal and administrative
details on the local level. As far as major Nazi-party members had held important
positions in the chambers, they were exchanged, but this did hardly touch upon
the basic infrastructure the chambers provided for business. Of course, it is very
hard to evaluate to what extent the chambers could really serve as valuable
substitutes for standard business associations; however, their very activity
indicates that the 'pause' of Allied occupation was after all not a genuine
discontinuity of business coordination and communication. In fact, the swiftness
with which employers' associations and the federation of German industries took
over their specific interest group tasks in the newly founded Federal Republic of
the early 1950s does not give the impression of a set of organizations that starts
anew and still searches for an identity and a specific purpose. It rather looks as if
the ground was very well prepared at that time, and that business organizations
took over again their well-defined traditional place.
8
Note that, until the second half of 1948, wages were controlled anyway.
On the matter of continuity of business interest groups during Allied occupation, see Homburg,
Schusslcr (1977) quoted in Eschenburg (1982).10
As to the re-emergence of unions - certainly the most prominent type of
distributional coalitions in Olsonian theory - the record looks very similar to that
of the left-wing political parties after the war (notably the Social Democrats): a
very fast reconstruction of the basic organizational structure under the guidance of
personalities who had played major parts in the labour movement of the Weimar
republic (notably Hans Bbckler) and who had survived the Nazi-period in
underground activity. Due to their consistent opposition to the Nazi regime, the
unions were viewed very favourably by the Allies - above all by the union-
friendly British labour government - and they were accepted as an important pillar
of a new German economy and society. On a local level, constituent meetings of
unions took place as early as summer 1945, and a conference of union deputies of
the British zone (which included the industrial heartland of the Rhine/Ruhr-valley)
was- held in December 1945. At this conference, the basic principles of
organization of unionism in Germany were laid out in a first statute, which was
approved by the British in January 1947. In the American zone, the development
was a bit slower and a bit more decentralized - no genuine zone-wide organization
was permitted to operate - but except in Bavaria, all major industrial unions were
established in these regions in the course of 1946 (in Bavaria not before
spring 1947). Interzonal conferences of unions were held regularly from
December 1946 on. In addition, union membership grew very fast: in the first full
year of its existence (1950), the DGB had 5.5 mio. members -two years later even
about 6 mio. - which amounted to a higher density rate than at any time up to the
present.
9 In short: at least with respect to the quality and the degree of
organization, it is very difficult to uphold the view that German unions were in
any sense weak for more than a very brief initial period of Allied occupation.
In a much more narrow sense, however, the unions were handicapped by a very
mundane event: the virtual destruction of their strike funds through the currency
reform of June 1948. For a while - maybe something like one or two years - most
unions were simply not financially potent enough to carry out any major strike,
and that may well have contributed substantially to a rather smooth working of the
bargaining process and relatively modest wage settlements.
1
0 However, this more
financial constraint falls well short of any more fundamental weakness of the
In 1950-52, about 38-39 per cent of all employees were organized in the DGB, a share that
gradually declined to roughly 30per cent by the mid-1960s and -after a sharp rise in the early
1970s - levelled off at about 33 per cent. If the union of white-collar workers (DAG) and the small
Christian unions are included, the density rate was somewhat higher throughout, with about the same
intcrtcmporal pattern. For statistical details, sec Hcmmer. Schmitz (1990).
See Giersch, Paquc, Schmicding (1992), p. 73.11
unions' position that could help to explain a larger chunk of the beginning
West German economic miracle of the 1950s. After all, with unions being
organizationally strong, one might then have expected sharp wage increases and
labour conflicts as soon as the strike funds were filled again, and this did
obviously not happen.
If unions were not in any sense weakened, the focus of an Olsonian defence may
shift to structural changes in their organization that might have made them less
militant in their pursuit of group interests. Just as the liberal and conservative
parties, they may have become more encompassing.
(b) Encompassing unions?
Historically, there were three major attempts of the unions after World War II to
make their organizations more encompassing. The first and most radical one was
to establish one 'central union' (Zentralgewerkschaft) comparable to the Swedish
LO that was supposed to carry out wage negotiations on a nation-wide basis in the
future. These efforts failed because of Allied resistance against any such large-
scale concentration of power in whatever hands. Recognizing the Allied veto as
insurmountable, the union leaders (notably their inoffial chairman Hans Bockler)
settled for a construction of autonomous industry unions under one umbrella
organization, which then later became the DGB. As its predecessor in the Weimar
republic, the ADGB, the new umbrella organization did in general not have a
mandate to conclude wage agreements so that the actual economic clout remained
with the industry unions, among them the large metal workers' union (IG Metall,
the largest industrial union in the world), which was to play a dominant role as a
pacemaker in the mostly annual bargaining rounds all over the following four
decades. As the ADGB in the Weimar republic so the DGB grew into the role of a
political arm of the union movement that coordinated general aims and targets
without interfering into actual bargaining matters. Hence, in this respect, the
discontinuity to earlier times appears to be not very significant.
The second attempt was to replace the Weimar-type crafts-based unions by strictly
industrial ones. In this sense the union leadership was fully successful and not
much controversy arose about this shift of organizational principles." The main
reason for the smooth transition was that, in the early 1930s, there had already
been a consensus on the necessity of this kind of reform, but the rise of Hitler and
Sec Hemmcr, Schmilz (1990), pp. 27-28.12
the subsequent suppression of the union movement prevented its being realized.
On first glance, this post-war reform seems to be a far-reaching step in the
Olsonian sense towards a more encompassing representation of interests.
1
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However, the extent of the organizational innovation should not be overrated
because major branches of industry had adopted a factual industry organization of
labour for a long time. E.g., metal workers, who at times made up 30 per cent of
all union members in the Weimar republic, were organized in the 'German Metal
Workers Union' (the predecessor of the IG Metall and already at that time the
largest single industrial union in the world, and a bargaining pacemaker!), which
was founded in 1891 as an industrial union and which carried out its collective
bargaining consistently on an industrial basis. Of course, the backbone of this
union (as of all others) were skilled workers, who made up about 2/3 of the
membership, but actual negotiations covered all skill groups (including unskilled
and semi-skilled workers).
1
3 Hence, after all, the gap between the Weimar and the
Bonn collective bargaining culture was probably much narrower than, say,
between the traditional crafts-based British and the German system, be it of the
Weimar or the Bonn variety.
The third attempt was to absorb various smaller unions of different ideological
standings - notably the more conservative Christian and the tiny liberal ones - as
well as the union of white collar-workers in the mainstream of the DGB. In the
end, after painful deliberations, this attempt failed mainly because the large DGB
quickly developed an identity of blue collar-worker representation with strong
political sympathies for reformist socialism, i.e., in the range of the German party
system, for social democracy.
1
4 Hence, just like in the Weimar republic, the union
movement did remain split although it is fair to say that the relative weight of the
dominating blue collar-umbrella organization, the DGB, was becoming even more
decisive than it used to be in Weimar times with respect to the ADGB. In any
case, it is unclear whether and to what extent all this had substantial influence on
bargaining, because neither the DGB nor the ADGB concluded collective
agreements; most likely, it did have some influence on the political voice of the
unions which may have been somewhat more homogenous in the last four decades
than it used to be in the Weimar republic.
Sec Olson (1982), p. 49.
For details, see Hartwich (1967), pp. 70-72.
After a brief period of merger with the DGB, the Christian unions split off in the early 1950s as they
did not recognize their more conservative stance sufficiently represented in the official union
position. As to white collar-workers, a sepcrate nation-wide union (the DAG) was founded in 1949
after unsuccessful negotiations with the DGB.1
3 BiWiothekdeslnsuttiB.
To sum up, there were certainly trends towards a more encompassing union
organization in the early post-war period, but it is hard to see anything
revolutionary in them. They appear to be more like the final conclusion of
developments that had been well under way in the Weimar republic. In any case,
there was no sharp 'Olsonian' discontinuity that may explain a dramatic shift from
aggressive wage demand based on narrow group interests towards moderation in
the interest of the whole economy.
Note that there was in fact one institutional change in the legal framework of
collective bargaining from Weimar to Bonn which, in our view, was much more
important than the more marginal shifts of union organization: the end of
compulsory arbitration.
1
5 Whereas, in the Weimar framework, an industrial
dispute could be settled by a rather complicated procedure which culminated in a
compulsory arbitration under the auspices of the Federal Minister of Labour, the
new law on collective bargaining of 1949 did not contain any such provisions of
state intervention in industrial disputes. Again, the explicitly wide interpretation of
private bargaining autonomy was a consequence of the bad Weimar experience
with this system, which uprooted the whole bargaining framework: instead of
being used as an instrument of last resort, it actually removed the pressure for
agreement from the parties and thus induced them to carry on with maximalist
positions and to speculate on the arbitration's likely bias. In all major industries, at
least half of the 'agreements' in the later years of the Weimar republic were
implemented via compulsory arbitration.
1
6 Nevertheless, industrial relations
remained bad, not least because most compulsory agreements were explicitly
disapproved by one party, in the majority of cases the employers' side, sometimes
even by both parties. The employers' associations regularly claimed that the
arbitrations had a bias towards labour interests, which was in fact plausible
because the labour ministry was always headed by union members with a strong
affiliation to either the Christian or the social democrat labour movement.
1
5 In all other respects including, e.g., special provisions concerning the possibility of declaring a
collective agreement generally binding under specific circumstances - the legal frameworks for
collective bargaining of the Weimar and the Bonn republic are remarkably similar. See Paque
(1993a).
1
6 See Hartwich, pp. 418-420; for a detailed account of the Weimar experience with compulsory
arbitration, sec Bahr (1989).14
It is important to realize that this institutional change and its likely consequences
is out of the scope of Olson's theory. If anything, his theory would predict the
removal of compulsory arbitration to have a negative impact on growth because it
dissolves a link of the behaviour of distributional coalitions to the public interest
via government intervention. Sure enough, however, this matter is very complex
and certainly not at the core of Olson's theory.
(c) Worsening distributional sklerosis over time?
If it is difficult to defend the view that there was a wholesale demise of
distributional coalitions after World War II, it is equally difficult to identify an
Olsonian process of sklerosis thereafter: once established, interest groups were
able to lobby for their purposes just as well in the early 1950s as in later decades.
This is particularly obvious for unions because the framework of collective
bargaining remained remarkably constant over time, with only a very few labour
law extensions and court decisions specifying the conditions of strikes and
lockouts that changed over time due to technical progress and the ever more
perfect logistics of firms. At any rate, these changes cannot remotely explain the
vast variations in wage behaviour between the 1950s and the 1980s on one side
- with a persistent decline of real unit labour costs, but different unemployment
records - and the first half of the 1970s when labour costs rose sharply and
aggravated the labour market plight and the growth slack.
Note that rejecting an Olsonian process of sklerosis as an explanation does not
imply rejecting any explanation of the relatively poor growth record of later
decades on basis of some sort of sklerosis. In fact, the German economy was
gradually subjected to an intricate network of regulations and administrative red
tape that was apt to leave traces in the growth of productivity - though it is of
course very difficult to quantify any such effects econometrically due to the
extremely complex channels of causality through which a process of sklerosis
works. However, it is to mean that such a sklerosis was not Olsonian in the sense
that it grew pari passu with the clout of distributional coalitions; rather it reflected
for a large part a general trend towards bureaucratization, which was present in
other western countries as well independent of their immediate post-war destiny,
and which calls for a more general theory in terms of the 'bureaucratic translation'
of certain consumer preferences (e.g. for a clean environment) into actual policy
practice.15
3. An Alternative View
In part 2, we made clear that we do not interpret the German post-war experience
as 'caused' by weak distributional coalitions in the Olsonian sense. However, this
does not mean that we regard the behavior of interest groups as irrelevant. We
rather think that the driving forces of the miracle have to be located in a non-
trivial sense on the supply side of the economy and the particular pattern of
specialization of German industry, with interest groups simply being overrun by a
long series of unanticipated positive shocks, which had positive persistence
effects
1
7 - just as the successive shrinkage of industry in the mid-1970s, the early
1980s and the early 1990s had or will have negative persistence effects. Hence,
even in a roughly stable institutional setting, there may be vastly different growth
performances and vastly different experiences of unemployment persistence and
employment growth.
To clarify the major line of our reasoning, let us briefly retell the story of the
German economic miracle in our own terms
1
8 and then draw some more general
conclusions.
(a) Interpreting the miracle
In our story of the German post-war revival, it is convenient to distinguish
between three periods, namely the 'post-war misery' (mid-1945 - mid-1948), the
"early reconstruction' (mid-1948 - mid-1950) and the 'miraculous growth'
(mid-1950-ca. 1957).
Mid-1945 - mid-1948
These three years were closest to an Olsonian institutional void. However,
contrary to Olson's interpretation, we take it that this void was filled rapidly and
decisively under the auspices of the Allied forces. With a grain of salt, one may
even speak of a wholesale institutional reconstruction, with a few deliberate
changes, notably some more encompassing political parties, a bit more
1
7 In the sense of Lindbcck, Snower (1986) and Blanchard, Summers (1986).
1
8 This will be an extremely condensed version of the extensive account in Giersch, Paquc,
Schmialing (1992), pp. 45-87.16
centralization in unionism, some significant moves towards a more balanced
federalism, and - a few months later - the introduction of a less interventionist
collective bargaining system than the one in the Weimar republic. These changes
were certainly facilitated by the presence of the Allies and their final say in all
de facto-constitutional matters; to a large extent, however, they were also
genuinely German lessons drawn from the surviving political elite of the Weimar
republic. In one important respect, the Allied occupation is likely to have made a
big difference: the timing and the radical shape of the currency reform, including
the establishing of an independent central bank. While there was a strong German,
ordoliberal lobby in favour of full-scale liberalization of prices and for a sharp cut
in the money supply, the political struggle about these matters would probably
have been much more protracted in the absence of an Allied 'superpower'.
It is remarkable that, in their liberalization parts, the reforms of mid-1948 were in
effect a reconstruction of the Weimar market economy, not the creation of
something new. Of course, for the people in the midst of post-war misery, it was a
huge step forward - and the ordoliberal literature coined the catchy name social
market economy, thus nurturing the general feeling that a completely new system
was founded. At base, however, the reforms did no more than remove the
economic heritage - monetary overhang, price controls - of the Nazi-dictatorship.
The skeleton of the welfare state remained basically the same as in Weimar - of
course, supplemented by a host of special provisions to deal with specific post-war
problems such as the reintegration of refugees.
Mid-1948 - mid-1950
These two years - roughly from the currency reform in 1948 up to the beginning
of the Korea boom in early summer 1950- were the time of rapid economic
reconstruction and rapid economic structural change in response to the new
liberalized price system, which brought a thorough reshuffling of the economy's
resources to more efficient uses. In many respects, it was comparable to the post-
socialist reallocation of resources in eastern Europe going on right now in
countries like Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary, but of course the task was
much simpler because the destruction (in the broad sense) and the distortions had
been much less severe in the first place. The war-time destruction turned out to be
relatively harmless in economic terms, because, with appropriate economic
incentives and the more or less undestroyed skill of the workforce, a large part of
the physical equipment could be put to use again rather easily. In addition, the
capital equipment was modern by all standards because the Nazi wartime effort17
did, if anything, spur technological progress despite the manifold allocative
distortions involved. Thus, economically speaking, the marginal productivity of
repair investments turned out to be extremely high, much higher than the public
and many specialists at the time anticipated.
1
9 Note the crucial difference to
today's post-socialism, where repair investments are on average much less
profitable, because the capital equipment is technically old-fashioned and to a
significant part economically obsolete. Hence the productivity head start that was
given to Germany after the currency reform, is simply out of reach for Eastern
Europe today. In the same vein, the distortions of the production structure were
substantial in post-war Germany - notably due to an overcrowded agriculture
which was flooded by refugees from the former eastern German provinces - but
certainly not comparable to the deep traces of misallocation incurred by four
decades of command economy.
It is important to realize that, by the term reconstruction, we do not mean anything
like a deterministically natural process going on more or less independent of the
major reform steps taken as the term has sometimes been used in the literature to
question the importance of the liberalization measures in 1948.
2
0 We rather regard
reconstruction as the immediate consequence of the reform package, which thus
really obtained its ex-post justification, just as the dramatic liberalization measures
in eastern Europe today are justified precisely on the grounds of the following
adjustment process, how ever protracted it turns out to be. This is not to say, that
any single point of the reform was absolutely necessary; it is to say, however, that
a major step towards liberalization was required to unleash the forces for
reconstruction and market-bound structural change.
2
1
Unions acted very cautiously in this period which, from early 1949 on, was a time
of cyclical consolidation, not of boom. As a consequence, business profits soared
and created the leeway for the necessary self-financing in the absence of well-
developed capital markets. At the same time, however, real wages grew quite fast
- by almost 16 per cent in 1949 and roughly 8 per cent in the first half of 1950 -
thus giving a quite satisfactory balance to union membership. As we argued
above, however, the unions' weakness was more practically based on the lack of
strike funds than on any organizational deficiencies in the Olsonian sense.
1
9 For details on the sharp productivity growth in this period, see Gicrsch, Paque, Schniicding (1992),
pp. 50-51, and Table 4.
2
0 In this sense, Abclshauser (1975,1979).
2
1 Sec Giersch, Paque, Schmicding (1992), pp. 39-41 for a more detailed critique of the original
Abelshauscr hypothesis concerning the relevance of the 1948-rcforms.18
Mid-1950s-ca. 1957
Beginning with the Korea boom, the West German economy embarked on a
growth journey that went clearly beyond mere reconstruction in the sense above.
From a bird's eye view, it can be interpreted as a sequence of unexpected positive
productivity and tertns-of-trade shocks emanating most of all from
West Germany's integration into the world economy. In fact, it was a process of
re-industrialization that drove unemployment to virtually zero within a few year's
time.
What were the driving forces of this process? As usual, there is a hen/egg-problem
in identifying the ultimate causes of what appears to be something like a
cumulative virtuous circle. Sure enough, it was not an internally engineered
demaricl expansion by whatever Keynesian means since the government and the
central bank took consistently a stability-oriented, non-activist stance in fiscal and
monetary matters. Beyond that, however, a number of different causes appear to
be relevant.
(i) Germany was simply lucky enough to have a traditional pattern of
specialization with a strong manufacturing industry that produced goods with
a relatively high income elasticity in world markets., notably investment
goods. This made the country the ideal supplier to export markets in times of
worldwide investment booms. Thus, whenever times were to be 'good' in the
world market in the first post-war decade, they would turn out to be even
better for West German producers.
(ii) Export demand met a very high supply elasticity, mainly because the
German economy had a large labour supply of skilled and highly mobile
workers - mainly refugees. In modern language, there was a large supply of
first-rate outsiders, and despite the existence of a rather generous welfare
state and unemployment benefits very similar to today's system, these
outsiders were not 'trapped' in a low search intensity of long-term
unemployment simply because, relative to their low reservation wage, the
emerging industrial jobs were well-paid and highly productive.
(iii) Unions remained relatively moderate in their wage demands, but not because
they were organizationally weak. Other reasons appear to be more important
to rationalize union behaviour. Firstly, until 1952, unions still pursued old
syndicalist aims of co-determination that went back to the Weimar republic.
These aims required much political lobby activity promising a rosy anti-
capitalist future that made short-run sacrifices in terms of wage demands17
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capitalist future that made short-run sacrifices in terms of wage demands19
look bearable.
2
2 In this sense, it was precisely the old-style socialist
radicalism of unions that prevented them from playing a more aggressive
part in the capitalist play of collective bargaining for higher wages.
Secondly, again in the early years, there was still a danger that the
unemployment among refugees might politically lead to a right-wing
backlash, which would have been counterproductive for unions' general aims
and their prospective role in society. Thus there might have been a certain
element of social responsibility due to the specific post-war problem setting.
Thirdly - and in our view most importantly - unions were (as everybody else)
repeatedly surprised by the waves of productivity growth and terms-of-trade
improvements hitting the German economy. Again and again in cyclical
upswings, there was a widespread belief that, now finally, the German
miracle was running out of steam and that the expansion would dissipate in
much more inflation and less real growth than last time. Not before the end
of the 1950s did this belief become reality. In other words, the supply
elasticity of the economy in view of unanticipated shocks was persistently
underestimated so that wage increases, which looked not so moderate ex ante
and which were demanded by unions with quite a bit of radical rhetorics,
turned out well bearable ex post. Once the real expansion had taken place,
however, the rationale for further wage increases had been reduced as well
because more outsiders had become insiders and 'voted' for cautiousness
within the unions. To be sure, the average wage increase of 8 per cent in
nominal and 6 per cent in real terms p.a. in the 1950s was anyway so good
by historical standards that it would have been very difficult for union
leaders to activate the membership with academic notions such as a higher
wage share in national income. In fact, some such attempts in the early 50s
badly failed.
(b) The role of institutions and distributional coalitions
Let us be very courageous for the moment and simply draw some general
conclusions from the German experience on the relevance of Olsonian and non-
Olsonian factors in and after large-scale liberalization experiments - of course, at
the full risk of over interpreting just one empirical example. Briefly summarized,
the conclusions would then be the following ones:
2
2 Sec Wallich (1955), pp. 307-310.20
(i) Radical reform steps from a command system or a fully administrated
economy to a market order are greatly facilitated if the power of interest
groups can be checked by whatever mechanism, in the post-war West
German case by foreign occupation. In this respect, central and eastern
European countries have a much more difficult task to solve because their
economic reforms are closely linked to the introduction of full-scale
democracy with the concomitant reawakening of private distributional
coalitions. To keep these interests at bay, these countries need a strong
'constitutional consensus' on the economic liberalization measures, which
may be reached in some countries - notably those with a tradition of a market
economy in the interwar period - but not in others. In this sense, Olsonian
factors are very important for the extent and the speed of implementation of
the reforms.
(ii) Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of the reform, it is very advantageous
if the thorough reallocation of resources that invariably follows the reform
can proceed without powerful distributional coalitions hindering or distorting
the process by enforcing an all too early profit squeeze on the fledgling
market economy. Again, West Germany was lucky in this respect if only for
the not really Olsonian reason that unions lacked the necessary strike funds
to back up a more militant stance in collective bargaining. At present in
central and eastern Europe, union influence is rather moderate as well, but
there are other distributional coalitions such as, e.g., the powerful farmers'
lobby in Poland that threaten to grind at least part of the reform process to a
halt.
(iii) Once the main brunt of the transformation or reallocation crisis is over and
those resources of the economy that are employed, are so in an efficient way
by the standards of a market economy - a state reached in post-war West
Germany at 10-12 per cent unemployment in early 1950 - the further growth
prospects depend above all on the economy's elasticity of goods supply and
the possibly accidental income elasticity of demand that prevails for its
product mix in world markets. In these respects, again, West Germany was
lucky in the 1950s, with a very high quality and mobility of its surplus
labour and a traditional strength in investment goods industries. A growth
theory aimed at explaining the German success would then primarily have to
focus on those long-term factors that brought about these favourable
circumstances, namely the decent technical education of the industrial
workforce in Germany (which is presumed to be on average much better
than, e.g., in Britain), the specific knowledge incorporated in the fast-21
growing export industries, and, ironically, the loss of the eastern provinces
and their relatively backward agriculture, which released a large, then highly
motivated and mobile labour force to find work in the industrial heartlands
of the West. These are precisely the factors that the new growth theories tend
to focus on,
2
3 and in this respect, they appear to be on the right track.
(iv) It is important to realize that, in a rapidly changing international division of
labour, factors that drive an economic success story in one period may
become the cause of decline in another, if only - for whatever reason - the
competitive edge of the country is eroded faster than that of other countries.
What brought hefty terms-of-trade gains in an earlier period need not do the
same in all subsequent ones so that economic growth may contain a
significant element of 'specialization luck'. In fact, recent empirical research
on growth
2
4 has shown that growth rates are highly unstable over time -
much more so than country characteristics - which points to strong elements
of terms-of-trade luck in the growth process. Presently, one may interpret the
quite dramatic crises of traditionally export-oriented investment goods
industries in countries like Sweden, Germany or Switzerland as a
fundamental erosion of their competitive position in world markets.
(v) Distributional coalitions may influence this process in a variety of ways, the
most important of which is the effect of unionism on the path of
unemployment. In this respect, the last four decades in West Germany
provide a particularly nice example: unionism added a strong element of
inertia to the adjustment of real wages, which thus transformed productivity
and terms-of-trade shocks into persistent changes of employment and
unemployment. In times of repeated unanticipated positive shocks like in the
1950s, this may lead into a genuine 'employment miracle'. In turn, in times
of powerful negative shocks to industrial employment as in the mid-1970s,
the early 1980s and probably also the early 1990s, it may induce a basically
irreversible rise of equilibrium unemployment- provided there is an
unemployment benefit system (as the German one) that links the benefit
level to the terminal wage and pays a rather generous share of this wage for a
very long period of time (in Germany indefinitely). By simply cutting off a
low wage employment segment, which exists and rapidly expanded in
countries like the United States that do have less union influence and much
less generous benefit systems, unemployment of formerly well-paid
2
3 Sec, e.g., Mankiw (1993), Paque (1993).
2
4 Sec Easterly clal. (1993).22
industrial workers is perpetuated: alimented by the benefit system, more
people are kept in subsidized search for the relatively small chunk of well-
paid industrial jobs. In the future, the most extreme example for this queuing
for high-paid jobs will probably become the eastern German economy where
a rather large part of formerly employed industrial workers will queue at the
gates of an industrial sector that will be much too small at the prevailing
locational conditions and the collectively negotiated wage to push
unemployment down to anything close to the western level.
(vi) Apart from its effect on employment, distributional coalitions may have
manifold detrimental consequences for economic growth to the extent that,
through their lobbying activity in favour of regulation of the economy, they
close options for the future. For the case of Germany, it would require an
immensely detailed empirical analysis to find out whether and to what extent
the marginal extension of regulatory rules and the welfare state became a
hindrance to growth or not. There are good reasons to suspect that it did
2
5
although, by the very nature of the question, one should not expect anything
like a conclusive empirical answer. But, to repeat, any such process of
institutional sklerosis appears to be much less the consequence of an
Olsonian resurgence of interest group power than of a change of interests
themselves.
2
5 See, e.g., the different articles in Giersch (1983).23
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